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The Last Martyrs – Omagh, Sinn Fein and the Republican Transition from Armalites to Ballot 
Boxes 
By James Siniscalchi 
 At 3:30 pm August 15, 1998, the quiet market town of Omagh was shattered by the 
explosion of a 500-pound car bomb.  Killed in the blast were Avril Monaghan, pregnant with 
near term twin girls, her 18-month old daughter, her mother and twenty-eight other women, 
children and shopkeepers.  Hundreds more were wounded or maimed. The victims were common 
people going about their daily lives, secure in the knowledge that, in light of the recently signed 
Good Friday Accords (GFA), sectarian violence was a thing of the past.
1
  The attack, conducted 
by a little known Irish Republican Army splinter group numbering fewer than thirty, was a 
defiant response by disaffected Republican extremists to the IRA Army Council’s acceptance of 
formal negotiations with Unionists, and marked the final turning point in Sinn Fein and the Irish 
Republican movement’s journey from violence.
2
 Unlike previous attacks, this singular event, 
aimed at destabilizing the agreement itself, galvanized both sides of the Republican / Unionist 
divide.  Public reaction to the bombing was well summed up by Liz O’Donnell, deputy foreign 
minister of the Irish Republic: “[…] People were lulled into a false sense of security. We thought 
we were all done with that. We had a deal with militant republicanism – and we felt double 
crossed.”
3
 Omagh eliminated the possibility that Sinn Fein would ever again be able to find 
public support for the armed struggle. Omagh was a point of no return for the Republican 
movement: while previously Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams and his Belfast faction had 
determined ongoing military action was counterproductive to achieving a unified Ireland and 
civil rights for Catholics in Ulster, public outcry after the bombing made any return to violent 
                                                          
1
 Cannon, Carl M., “Little Respite on an Island of Rage,” National Journal 30.30 (Sept. 5, 1998): pp. 2034-35. 
2
 Gelb, Norman, “Northern Ireland After Omagh: Uncertain Peace,” The New Leader 8.11 (Oct. 5, 1998): p. 5. 
3
 Cannon, p. 2035. 
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action retrograde. “’I believe the Omagh bombing was a watershed,’ said Seamus Mallon, the 
highest-ranking Catholic official in the new Northern Ireland governmental body.  ‘People have 
drawn a line in the sand beyond which violence will never be allowed to exist here again.’”
4
 
 Securing IRA disarmament, in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing, marked Sinn Fein’s 
final transition from front organization to legitimate political party. The significance of 
examining this transition lays in the hope that, by examining Sinn Fein and the Irish experience, 
a guide may be found to peaceful resolution of other long standing ethno-religious conflicts. 
 For the bulk of its study, the Republican movement has been seen as a fringe 
manifestation of the frustrations of poor and working class Catholics, with no legitimate interest 
in the political process. The inclusion of Sinn Fein in the negotiation of the GFA unnaturally 
shifted the balance of power.
5
 By allowing what was perceived as the front organization of the 
IRA to take the leading role during the peace process without securing a renunciation of the 
armed struggle, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, intentionally or 
not, legitimized the IRA’s militarism.
6
 As a result, the Republican movement must be 
reevaluated.
7
 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Shirlow, Peter and Mark McGovern, “Language, Discourse and the Irish peace process,” Political Geography 17(2), 
p.174.  Sinn Fein’s inability to consistently earn more than 10-13% of the votes cast in national elections in the 
1980s, at the height of its pre-Good Friday Accords political popularity, suggests that the inclusion of Sinn Fein in 
peace negotiations over compensated the party for its meager political support.  
6
 Richards, A., “Terrorist groups and political fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the peace process and democracy,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 13(4): p. 77. 
7
 McBride, Ian, “The Shadow of the Gunmen: Irish Historians and the IRA,” Journal of Contemporary History 46(3): 
p. 690-1, 702 and 708.  Traditional scholarship with regard to the history of The Troubles tends toward a non-
partisan Unionist bias. While later schools of thought attempted to address this issue, Republicanism generally, 
and Sinn Fein in particular, had always been treated as a fringe movement, not legitimate and not part of main 
stream Irish nationalism. While beyond the scope of this paper, this historiography has been extensively covered 
by Ian McBride and his insight informs this work.  
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 The late 1960s, and particularly 1969, were a transitional time for civil rights movements 
globally, and Irish Republicanism presented no exception.
8
 A distinct rise in sectarian violence in 
Belfast, particularly during the Protestant late summer marching season of 1969, created a crisis 
within the leadership of the IRA. Disconnected from the plight of northern Catholics, the 
traditional Dublin-based leadership had taken a significant turn to the left, openly espousing a 
political agenda which included hardline Marxist ideology and a heightened involvement in the 
Parliamentary electoral process of the Republic – a shift which alienated conservative rural 
Catholics as well as the urban fighters of Belfast, who, faced with increasing British and 
Protestant repression, who became ever more invested in a militant solution. This factional 
schism, prompting extensive intra-Republican violence, resulted a distinct shift in leadership 
from Dublin to the newly-formed provisional-wing of the movement headquartered in Belfast. 
Ironically, a young Republican named Gerry Adams, with sympathies on both sides of the split, 
took on a key leadership role in this new power structure, and was instrumental in the IRA’s 
decision to escalate the military campaign. After the split, increasingly the official wing of the 
IRA was marginalized and both leadership and momentum shifted to the Provisionals in the 
north. This factional spit would foreshadow ongoing dissention in the movement well into the 
early 2000s, with a notable distinction: Adams and the provisional leadership in Belfast would be 
the ones pursuing a distinctly political agenda.  Intra-Republican bitterness surrounding this 
change in ideology and tactics would continue to plague the prospects for lasting peace. 
9
 
 While the goals of the Republican movement, Irish unification, Catholic emancipation in 
the North and an end to British occupation, were always inherently political, in the aftermath of 
                                                          
8
 While this global socio-political trend is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that 
further study of the Republican movement in this context is worthy of consideration. 
9
 Moloney, Ed, Voices from the grave: Two men’s war in Ireland, (Public Affairs: Philadelphia), p.42-92 
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the Official / Provisional IRA split and subsequent shift in leadership, shockingly, there was no 
sophisticated ongoing Republican political program. The IRA’s initial strategy was, through 
direct military action, to attempt to expel British forces from Ulster. Given the disparity in 
military capability, the failure of this direct strategy seems to have been inevitable. Coupled with 
the increasing sophistication of British counter-insurgency tactics, the IRA leadership was forced 
to adopt more long term, low intensity tactics: a war of attrition waged against the economic 
infrastructure of Ulster, targeted to wear away British resolve to continue the occupation. Under 
this strategy, Sinn Fein’s role was simply to act as “[the] propaganda machine which would 
provide ideological support for the ongoing military campaign.”
10
 
 By the late 1970s, the young, urban and, increasingly political Belfast faction of Sinn 
Fein, under the leadership of Adams and Martin McGuinness, acknowledged that gathering 
political support from the majority of the Irish nationalist community was both integral to 
furthering the IRA’s agenda and would require a concerted campaign of political activity. 
Propaganda support alone was no longer sufficient.  The resulting Armalites and Ballot Boxes 
campaign, a combination of the effort to establish Sinn Fein as a significant voice within the 
nationalist political community
11
 and an escalation of IRA attacks to avoid the implication of 
cowardice, was the preliminary attempt at a more political, rather than military approach.
12
 
 Initially, significant gains were made through this coordinated approach, reaching a high 
water mark with the 1983 Westminster election, where Sinn Fein was able to garner 43% of the 
nationalist vote, however, the contradictory nature of the Armalites and Ballot Boxes policy 
                                                          
10
 Shirlow, p. 174. 
11
 These political gains were primarily focused on undermining Sinn Fein’s chief political rival, the more moderate 
Social Democratic Liberal Party (SDLP). As with earlier Republican criticism of the Home Rule party in the 1870s and 
80s, Sinn Fein painted the SDLP’s reform minded approach as collaborationist. 
12
 Ibid. 
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proved difficult to overcome. While Sinn Fein was able to earn broader support from the 
nationalists, IRA violence and the resultant Unionist reprisals, only served to further alienate the 
northern electorate. In subsequent elections Sinn Fein proved unable to earn more than 10-13% 
of votes cast. Republican violence was focused on forcing the British to concede that Ulster 
could not be governed in a “legitimate and stable manner” and force a withdrawal, naïvely 
failing to recognize the pervasive nature of Unionism and the firmly held majority belief that 
continued partition or unification should be decided by consensus.
13
 
The Unionist community and Unionist sentiment were as much of a stumbling block to 
unification as the British government. A distinct Unionist cultural identity had evolved and 
escalating Republican violence only served to harden its resolve. That the vast majority of those 
killed, as much as 90%, were not British military, but civilians, local security forces or Unionist 
paramilitaries undercut Sinn Fein’s social justice rhetoric and instead supported the idea that the 
conflict was a civil war. Additionally, a moderation of the British position allowed that they 
would support unification if a consensus was reached, further weakening Sinn Fein’s arguments 
for Republican legitimacy.
14
  
Republican violence alienated mainstream northern voters and participation in the 
parliamentary process undermined the IRA’s core ideological claim, based on the election of 
1918, they represented the only legitimate government of all of Ireland (a policy known as 
Abstentionism). Without a moderation in this core Republican belief, the Belfast faction realized 
that further political expansion was impossible. Furthermore, there was a dawning recognition 
among this group that the non-democratic tactics of the IRA might be undermining the goal of 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., p.174-175. 
14
 Ibid., p.174-176. 
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unification. At great risk of splintering the Republican movement, in recognition of this reality, 
Sinn Fein made significant attempts throughout the 1980s to win an electoral mandate in the 
Irish Republic. While Armalites and Ballot Boxes incorporated a significant political component, 
at its core, it remained a largely military strategy. Failure to dislodge the British occupation as 
well as failure to achieve more than 6% of the vote in national elections indicated that the 
campaign had failed and continued use of violence was increasingly unjustifiable, even among 
Sinn Fein supporters. Failure to generate popular support for the continued military campaign 
signaled failure of the policy as a whole. Increasingly, there was a realization within the Belfast 
faction that the IRA “made itself a cause of war [and] that it was doing little more than alienating 
sections of both communities whose consent […] was essential to advance Irish unification.” 
John Hume, leader of the moderately nationalist Social Democratic Liberal Party (SDLP) and 
Sinn Fein’s chief nationalist rival, went so far as to say that the British government was no 
longer the chief impediment to unification.
15
  
Armalites and Ballot Boxes, while unsuccessful in achieving the ultimate goal of ending 
the occupation, did force the governments of Britain and the Irish Republic to make policy 
changes. Sinn Fein’s political advancement in the 1980s, coupled with the realization by the 
British government that the IRA could not be easily defeated militarily, forced a revitalization of 
cooperation with the Republic. The 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement, an attempt to open dialog 
between the nationalist community, the Irish Republic and the British government purposely 
excluded any group who refused to renounce violence in an attempt to marginalize Sinn Fein, but 
also signaled that a negotiated settlement might be possible. British willingness in the 1980s and 
early 1990s to accept unification by consensus further undermined Sinn Fein’s arguments that 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
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Britain was an aggressor pursuing imperialistic aims, and the possibility of dialog toward a 
multi-party negotiated settlement became real if Sinn Fein could find a way to recognize a more 
pluralistic nationalist interest. Increasingly, sectarian violence was the significant factor in 
maintaining the militarization of the conflict and preventing useful dialog toward a solution. The 
rise of a Catholic middle class in Ulster, with the resultant shift in values toward more 
materialistic goals and away from Republican political ideals served to further erode Sinn Fein’s 
traditional base of support.
 
 Another, more significant shift in political strategy was required for 
Sinn Fein, the IRA and the Republican movement to maintain relevancy.  Despite the risk, and 
the very real threat of intra-republican violence, moderation of the policy of Abstentionism was 
essential.
16
  
The shift was signaled in the 1989 book, A Scenario for Peace, where Adams set out a 
strategy for cooperation with various national and international bodies to secure peace and 
support for Irish unification. This strategy, using the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985, an attempt 
to open a dialog between the nationalist community, the Irish Republic and the British 
government, as a framework for uncovering common objectives, signaled a willingness by Sinn 
Fein to operate within a diplomatic and political framework. For the first time, the possibility of 
negotiated settlement through peaceful dialog was acknowledged by the Republican leadership 
as a path toward non-violent resolution to the conflict. In this way, Sinn Fein signaled a further 
willingness to join an Irish unification community including moderate elements, like the Irish 
Republic and the SDLP, and by the late 1980s a broad nationalist position began to develop 
based on the key principal of national self-determination.  Mindful that under Armalites and 
                                                          
16
 Ultimately, this moderation did result, in 1986, in the formation of strongly abstensionist splinter groups like 
Republican Sinn Fein and The Real IRA, which, as evidenced by the Omagh bombing, would have a bloody impact 
on the peace process.  Ibid., p.176 and 177. 
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Ballot Boxes, Sinn Fein effort was focused on undermining the SDLP, significant dialog was 
required to reconcile the two parties. What emerged, in 1988, was an understanding that, while 
fundamentally in disagreement over methods, the two groups shared a common goal of 
unification. This understanding required that Sinn Fein dilute its Marxist social radicalism in an 
effort to appeal to the SDLP’s more mainstream liberal ideology and tone down its revolutionary 
criticism of the SDLP’s participation within governmental structures.
17
 By 1991, this shift also 
allowed for protracted secret negotiations between Sinn Fein and the British government, which 
lead to an understanding that, if the IRA halted their violent campaign a systematic withdrawal 
over time was achievable. In the words of Sinn Fein councilor for North Belfast, Joe Austen: 
“[…] they wished to disengage. The problem for them was that they could not be seen to 
disengage because of IRA activity[.]”
18
  Sinn Fein’s response was a new political strategy - the 
unarmed struggle. 
This shift away from militancy allowed for a re-imagining of the roles of the British and 
Irish governments. While in the past the British pursued a policy of containment and isolation 
with regard to Sinn Fein, this new political environment forced a need to draw new parties to the 
negotiating table. The shift away from violence also opened the opportunity for a reevaluation of 
the roots of Unionist identity. To make these changes required recognition of the largely 
superficial nature of the traditional Protestant / Catholic sectarian conflict and acknowledged the 
need for reconciliation.
19
 Central to Sinn Fein’s commitment to the peace process was the 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., p. 177. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 The division of communities between Catholic and Protestant, while certainly rooted in British discrimination 
against Catholicism and the associated policies in Ulster, could leave one with the mistaken impression that, at 
their core, The Troubles were a conflict between two fanatically religious sects. It is important to recognize, in 
modern times, the causes of friction were largely social, economic and political, rather than religious. It is also 
important to acknowledge that the ongoing conflict placed significant parts of both communities in similar 
economic peril. Sinn Fein’s Marxist ideology, to some degree, acknowledged this commonality within Ulster’s 
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recognition of the British need and intension to withdraw.  It is important to note that this 
moderation of ideology was conducted without either, overtly accepting the legitimacy of the 
established British position in Ulster, nor relinquishing the legitimacy of the IRA’s past 
militancy. Adams also called on the Republic to “take the initiative.” Specifically, he urged the 
Dublin government to enlist international support for the peace process and advised, in an effort 
to re-contextualize Unionism in the framework of unification, to “reassure the unionist 
community of a total commitment to their civil and religious rights […].”
20
 The softening of Sinn 
Fein’s traditional ideology allowed for the party’s reintegration into the broader Irish nationalist 
movement, inclusive of the SDLP, the Irish Republic and (to some degree) more moderate pro-
Unionist organizations. This acceptance that “reconciliation through constructive dialog and 
debate” with Unionists was at the core of this transition.
21
 Buoyed by global events, Adams’ 
Sinn Fein, less defined by traditional concepts of sectarian conflict and more defined in the 
context of justice (both social and economic), national identity and community encouraged their 
own broader acceptance and fostered the type of broad based support the party had long sought. 
It was in this context that Sinn Fein was able to call for demilitarization of the conflict and 
establish its criteria for peace.
22
  
At midnight on August 31, 1994 the IRA declared its readiness to abandon violence and 
pursue a negotiated peace by ordering its fighters to lay down their arms. “’The struggle is not 
over,’ Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein, the I.R.A.’s political arm, told hundreds outside his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
working class. While religion served as the significant division amongst the communities, the points of 
disagreement were far more secular; religious affiliation was simply an easy short-hand for distinguishing the 
factions. 
20
 Adams, Gerry, Free Ireland: Toward a Lasting Peace (Niwot, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart: 1986, 1994), p.178-179. 
21
 Ibid., p.177. 
22
 Shirlow, p.179. 
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headquarters. ‘The struggle has entered a new phase.’”
23
 In December of 1993 the British and 
Irish governments outlined the terms under which Sinn Fein could join peace negotiations, and 
an agreement to permanently end the violence was a key stipulation. By unilaterally ending the 
violence, Adams and Sinn Fein were able to secure a seat at the negotiating table without 
addressing decommissioning, and to demand a corresponding reduction in military presence by 
Britain.
24
 Adams, in one broad gesture, and through distancing himself from a doctrine already 
determined counterproductive to the movement, had succeeded in securing Sinn Fein’s continued 
involvement in the design of a post-colonial Irish state. Ominously, the issue of permanent IRA 
disarmament was left unaddressed. While the 1994 cease fire was a significant step toward 
putting an end to the conflict, the IRA retained the capability to use violence to advance their 
political agenda. In a moment which seems prescient, John Alderdice, leader of the bipartisan 
Alliance Party (drawing on both Republican and Unionist constituents for support), advocated 
cautioned, “’[…] most people here feel they judge the [IRA] by their actions and not by their 
words, […]. So everyone will be watching very closely to see what happens.’”
25
  On February 9, 
1996, only eighteen months after the announcement, a massive explosion ripped through the 
Canary Wharf section of East London, killing two and wounding at least one hundred “on ‘direct 
instructions from the army leadership.’”
26
 
 Within hours after an IRA announcement that they would resume the armed struggle in 
reaction to British insistence that the issue of IRA weapons be resolved before Sinn Fein would 
be accorded full standing in the negotiations, the British, Irish and American governments were 
                                                          
23
 Schmidt, William E., “I.R.A. Declares Cease-Fire, Seeing ‘New Opportunity’ to Negotiate Irish Peace,” New York 
Times, September 1. 1994. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Stevenson, Richard W., “I.R.A. Issues Claim of Responsibility for London Bomb,” New York Times, February 11, 
1996. 
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faced with the likely collapse of the peace process. Concern was expressed at the time that this 
action indicated a split between Sinn Fein and the IRA Army Council; that Adams, forced to 
walk a tightrope between hard line advocates of a continued military campaign frustrated by the 
perceived lack of progress toward withdrawal and his pursuit of a peaceful resolution, had been 
excluded from the decision to resume violence. More disturbingly, 2001 revelations indicating 
Adams and McGuinness’ leadership of the Army Council
27
, point toward Adams’ complicity in 
the bomb plot and suggest that he had resorted to violence in an effort to break the stalemate. In 
radio and television interviews only a day after the bombing, Adams insisted he had no prior 
knowledge, and that “blame for the bombing was ‘squarely with the I.R.A.,’ and [that the attack] 
left him ‘very sad.’” Notably, Adams refused to condemn the attack.
28
  
In the aftermath of the bombing, the importance of external pressure, particularly from 
the Clinton administration, cannot be overlooked. Through encouraging close contact between 
Adams and his administration, exploitation of the special relationship with Britain, and in 
cooperation with the Republic, Clinton encouraged the resumption of negotiations under 
conditions which all parties found tolerable, if not amenable. After a lapse the cease fire resumed 
and the peace process continued.
29
 
The Canary Wharf episode, while disruptive of the process, also signaled the willingness 
of the involved parties to overcome significant obstacles in pursuit of a lasting peace. Brokered 
with American help and signed on Good Friday, April 10, 1998, the Good Friday Accords 
established a structure for the devolution of home rule in the North. Ratified with 85% of popular 
                                                          
27
 Clark, Liam, “Leaked list names the men who run the IRA,” Sunday Times, London, March 25, 2001, p. 28. 
28
 Stevenson. 
29
 Ibid. 
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support in both Ulster and the Republic
30
, the GFA represented the most substantive step toward 
a permanent solution to sectarian violence, however, the issue of decommissioning IRA weapons 
was still left open.
31
 Sinn Fein’s inability to deliver on disarmament would continue to haunt the 
peace process. While the end of The Troubles seemed at hand, within three months, this illusion 
was to be shattered by a Saturday morning bombing in the market town of Omagh. 
On Thursday, September 3, 1998, less than a month after the bombing, American 
President Bill Clinton visited Ulster on the hope that he could “encourage various symbolic 
gestures on the part of the feuding parties [,]” which might ameliorate the mistrustful situation 
and salvage the peace process.
32
 The preceding Monday night, Sinn Fein Vice President, Pat 
Doherty, appeared on television in front of a live audience to discuss the peace process and was 
welcomed with an overwhelmingly negative response. Faced with mounting pressure to 
immediately renounce violence and disarm the IRA, and stuck by the vehemence of the outcry, 
both public and diplomatic, two days before Clinton’s arrival, Adams announced: “Sinn Fein 
believe the violence we have seen must be for all of us now a thing of the past, over done with 
and gone. I am committed to play my part, as is Sinn Fein.”
33
 While leveraging the IRA’s 
continued access to weapons had, up to that point, been critical to Adams’ negotiation strategy in 
an effort to secure as much reform as possible, the use of implied Republican violence was no 
longer tenable. While Unionist leaders argued that the statement was insufficient because it did 
not address decommissioning, within days Adams had appointed Martin McGuinness, long time 
                                                          
30
 Cannon, p. 2034. 
31
 Crook, Clive, “Peace in Northern Ireland? Not just yet,” National Journal 32.7 (2000): p. 452. 
   
32
 Cannon, pp. 2034-2036. 
33
 Ibid. 
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Belfast associate, Sinn Fein negotiator and former Chief of Staff of the IRA, (and future Deputy 
First Minister of Northern Ireland) to negotiate the dismantling of IRA weapons stockpiles.
34
  
Ultimately it was this commitment to decommissioning which lent credibility to Sinn 
Fein’s transformation; the culmination of thirty years of increasingly sophisticated political 
strategies. While outside international support and involvement was important to the peace 
process, pragmatism and a willingness to accept that a political, not a military, solution was the 
only available path to achieve Republican goals, was the impulse which ensured peace. The party 
could no longer consider a return to militarism -- public reaction after Omagh ensured that. The 
hardening of American attitudes toward terrorism in the early 2000s only served to make the 
repercussions of a return to an armed struggle simply too dire to consider.
35
 By renouncing 
violence once and for all, Adams had finally placed Sinn Fein on the path to democratic 
legitimacy. While parliamentary challenges remained, after Omagh, the specter of large scale 
Republican violence no longer loomed over the political future of Ulster. The future of post-
colonial Ireland would be born at the ballot box and the negotiating table, not from the barrel of 
an Armalite. 
   
   
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Ibid., p.2036. 
35 Richards, p.82. 
13
Siniscalchi: The Last Martyrs
Published by Digital Commons at Buffalo State, 2015
Siniscalchi - 14 
 
 
 
Bibliography: 
Gerry Adams, Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace, (Niwot, Colorodo: Roberts Rinehart, 1994). 
 
Gerry Adams, “It’s Time for US to Make Peace,” Irish Voice (New York), September 25, 2001: 
 p.8. 
 
Gerry Adams, “Another good Friday: Northern Ireland’s peace process in a new phase. The 
 parties have shown they can work together,” The Guardian (London), February, 6 2010: News:  
 p. 36. 
 
________. “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle, 5 February 2010” (2010). NIDirect Government Services.  
 Government of Northern Ireland. http://www.nidirect.gov.uk/castle_final_agreement15_2_-3.pdf  
 (accessed April 4, 2013). 
 
Carl Cannon, “Little Respite on an Island of Rage,” National Journal 30, no. 36 (1998): pp.2034-2036. 
 
Liam Clarke, “Leaked list names the men who run the IRA,” The Sunday Times (London), March 
25, 2001: Regional News: p.28. 
 
Clive Crook, “Peace in Northern Ireland? Not Just Yet,” National Journal 32, no. 7 (2000): p. 452. 
Points of View Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed April 6, 2013). 
 
Robert Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
 
Norman Gelb, “Northern Ireland After Omagh: Uncertain Peace,” The New Leader 8, no. 11 (1998): pp. 
5-7. 
 
Ann Marie Imbornoni, Borgna Brunner, and Beth Rowen, “The Northern Irish Conflict: A 
Chronology,” Information Please Database, Pearson Education Inc. (2007),  
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/northireland1.html. 
 
_________. “Investing in peace,” Irish America 10, no. 6 (1994): p. S 30. 
 
Ian McBride, “The Shadow of the Gunman: Irish Historians and the IRA,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 46, no. 3 (2011): pp. 686 – 710. 
 
Martin McGuinness, “We must reach out to all traditions: Northern Ireland’s new Education 
Minister Martin McGuinness give his personal view of the way forward in peace,” The Observer 
(London), June 4, 2000: News: p. 33. 
 
Martin McGuinness, “All identities and cultures need to be given respect; Politicians need to step 
up to the mark over flag protests. There can be no more excuses of prevaricating, says Martin 
McGuinness,” Belfast Telegraph, January 18, 2013: News: p.31. 
14
The Exposition, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/exposition/vol3/iss1/3
Siniscalchi - 15 
 
 
Moloney, Ed, Voices from the grave: Two men’s war in Ireland (Philadelphia: Public Affairs, 2010). 
 
Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in 
Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 1990). 
 
A. Richards, “Terrorist groups and political fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the peace process and 
democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): pp. 72-89. 
 
William E. Schmidt, “Cease-fire in Northern Ireland: The Overview; I.R.A. declares cease-fire, 
seeing ‘new opportunity’ to negotiate Irish peace,” New York Times, September 1, 1994. 
 
________, “Setback in Northern Ireland” (2003), Christian Science Monitor, December 2002, vol. 8. 
Canadian Reference Centre, EBSCOhost (accessed April 6, 2013). 
 
Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern, “Language, discourse and dialog: Sinn Fein and the Irish 
peace process,” Political Geography 17, no. 2 (1998): pp. 171-186. 
 
Richard W. Stevenson, “I.R.A. issues claim of responsibility for London bomb,” New York Times, 
February 11, 1996. 
 
15
Siniscalchi: The Last Martyrs
Published by Digital Commons at Buffalo State, 2015
